Abstract. This paper discusses progress in the verification of security protocols. Focusing on a small, classic example, it stresses the use of program-like representations of protocols, and their automatic analysis in symbolic and computational models.
The WMF Protocol in the Pi Calculus
Specifying the WMF protocol or another protocol can be, to some extent, a simple matter of programming. For each role in the protocol (A, B, or S), one writes code that models the actions of a principal that plays this role. We need not write code for the adversary, which we treat as the environment, and over which we typically have a universal quantification. Similarly, we do not write code for principals that pretend to play a role but do not actually follow the protocol, since those principals can be regarded as part of the adversary.
Note that principals and roles are distinct. Indeed, a principal may play multiple roles, for instance being the initiator A in one session and the interlocutor B in a concurrent session. A role is basically a program, while a principal is a host that may run this program, as well as other programs.
The programs can be written in a variety of ways. We have often used process calculi, and in particular two extensions of the pi calculus: the spi calculus and the applied pi calculus [5, 6] .
-The basic pi calculus offers facilities for communication on named channels, for parallel composition, and for generating fresh names, which may represent fresh cryptographic keys. For example, ((νk).c k ) | c(x).d x is a process that generates a fresh name k and then sends it on the channel c, in parallel with a process that receives a message on c, with formal name x, then forwards it on d. In this small example, one may think of c and d as public channels on which an attacker may also communicate, for instance intercepting k. More generally, public channels are often represented by free names, not bound by ν.
-The extensions of the pi calculus include both data structures and symbolic representations of cryptographic functions. Tupling, encryption, hashing, signatures, and many of their variants can be accommodated. For instance, classically, {M } k may represent the shared-key encryption of the message M under the key k.
This approach has been followed in modeling many protocols (e.g., [3, 4, 9, 13, 18, 19, 37, 39] ). Techniques from the programming-language literature, such as typing, have been employed for proofs, sometimes with substantial extensions or variations; specialpurpose techniques have also been developed and exploited, as in the tool ProVerif on which we rely below (e.g., [2, 10, 23, 24, 28, 33, 36] ). Research on related formalisms includes many similar themes and methods (e.g., [8, 22, 27, 29, 38, 45] ). Over the last decade, this approach to modeling and proving has evolved and matured considerably. Most noticeably, proof techniques have progressed in their power and sophistication. Partly because of this progress, the specifics of modeling protocols has changed as well.
We use the WMF protocol to illustrate this point. The original paper on the spi calculus [6] contains a description of the WMF protocol (with nonce handshakes rather than timestamps). Below, we give a new description of this protocol. The two descriptions differ on many small but often interesting points. In particular, the new description models probabilistic encryption [31] , in which the encryption function has a third parameter that serves for randomizing ciphertexts: {M } r k represents the encryption of M under k with random component r. This random component ensures that an attacker cannot recognize when two different ciphertexts have the same underlying plaintext. The new description is also crafted so as to be within the realm of application of ProVerif, CryptoVerif, and the general soundness results that map symbolic guarantees to computational guarantees.
The WMF Protocol in the Pi Calculus. We represent principal names by parameters like a and b. The role of A may be executed by any principal a, and the role of B by any principal b. We write k as and k bs for the respective keys shared with the server.
The code for the role of A may be given three parameters: an identity a, an identity b, and a key k as . This code first generates a fresh process id pid. Since a may run concurrently several copies of the same program, possibly with the same partner, pid is useful in distinguishing the different copies. Next, the code generates a new key k, called K AB in the informal description of Section 2. The code then communicates on a public channel c. It sends a triple that contains pid, a, and A. (This message and similar ones below do not appear in the informal description of the protocol but are helpful for enabling the application of computational-soundness results.) It also sends a pair that contains a and the ciphertext { c 0 , b, k } r kas . Here r is a freshly generated name, and c 0 is a constant that represents the message type. A distinct constant c 1 will tag the message from S to B. The two tags c 0 and c 1 , although rudimentary, serve for avoiding confusion between messages and suffice for the properties that we establish.
Note that the messages do not specify destinations. Destinations could be included in message headers, but an attacker could change them anyway, so they have no value from the point of view of security.
As a variant, which we adopt, we may wish to quantify over any possible partner b, letting the environment (that is, the attacker) choose b, thus:
Here a receives a message x and performs some computations and tests on x. Specifically, a tries to retrieve the first component of a (supposed) pair using the projection function π 1 , then examines the first component to check that the message is intended for this instance. If the projection fails, then the equality test fails as well. If the equality test fails, then the execution stops. (An alternative could be to restart the program or to wait for another message.) In case of success, on the other hand, b is bound to the second component (π 2 (x)) of the message. Otherwise, the execution stops; 0 is the null process.
In this presentation we take some liberties-all the i's will be dotted for the ProVerif version of the code, which we describe below. In particular, we omit the axioms for encryption and decryption. We also use a shorthand for pattern matching: we write inputs of the form c(t) when t is a term that can supposedly be decomposed by the principal that receives the message. Such matching tests can be desugared to conditionals in a standard way; variables that occur in the term t are parts of the messages that are not checked and they are bound with a let construction. With this notation, we can rewrite P A as follows:
Similarly, we specify the process P B :
Here m is an arbitrary message that is supposed to remain secret. According to this code, b sends the secret only to a. However, we may want to enable b to interact with any other principal, sending them an appropriate secret, or nothing at all. In order to model this possibility, we simply show another version of the program in which the final payload is not sent:
Finally, we specify the process P S :
We also consider two variants of P S in which one of the protocol participants A and B is compromised.
We represent a corrupted principal by letting S get its key from the environment. The case in which both A and B are compromised is less interesting, because in that case S can be simulated by the environment entirely. (Similarly, we do not specify corrupted versions of P A or P B , because they can be simulated by the environment.) We assemble these definitions, letting a, b, and the server run any number of copies of their respective programs (for simplicity with a single parameter m):
Here ! is the replication operator, so !P behaves like an unbounded number of copies of P in parallel; formally, !P ≡ P |!P . The names k as and k bs are bound. This binding manifests an important feature of the process calculus: such a construction hides the names, which are not visible outside their scope. The process P therefore expresses that k as and k bs are not a priori known outside, unless they are leaked on a public channel.
The process calculus and ProVerif also allow more compact and more convenient representations of P , as well as many variants and elaborations. We rely on the definitions above partly because we wish to match the conditions of the computationalsoundness results. For instance, we avoid the use of functions that link keys to principal names (which are common in ProVerif models, but which appear to be computationally unsound), and also the use of private channels (which may be permitted by ongoing work on computational soundness). As research in this area progresses further, we anticipate that those results will be increasingly flexible and general.
The WMF protocol has several standard security properties. In particular, it preserves the secrecy of the payload m. Formally, this secrecy can be expressed as an observational equivalence: P (m) ∼ P (m ), for all m and m . It holds even in the case where m and m are not atomic names, and it precludes even the leaking of partial information about m and m . For these reasons, this property is sometimes called "strong secrecy".
As we show below, ProVerif offers one particularly effective method for establishing such security properties. There are others, sometimes relying in part on techniques from the pi calculus (as in [6] , for instance).
The WMF Protocol in ProVerif. The WMF protocol can be programmed much as above in the input language of ProVerif. In this language, the encryption {m} r k is written encrypt(m, k, r). Encryption and decryption are declared in ProVerif by:
which introduces a function symbol encrypt of arity 3 and a function symbol decrypt defined by a rewrite rule decrypt(encrypt(x , y, r ), y) → x , which means that decryption of a ciphertext with the correct key yields the plaintext. Furthermore, we add a function symbol keyeq that allows the adversary to test equality between keys of two ciphertexts:
This function symbol models that the encryption scheme is not key-concealing (so the computational-soundness result of Section 4 can be applied without assuming that encryption is key-concealing).
At the level of processes, the input language of ProVerif is an ASCII syntax for the applied pi calculus. For example, the process P A (a, k as ) is coded:
The language uses new for ν, out(c, m) for c m , and in(c, m) for c(m). The syntax of patterns is made more explicit, by adding an equality sign (as in = pid , for example) when making a comparison with a known value. Other minor departures from the definition of P A (a, k as ) above are changes in the identifiers. The other processes that represent the WMF protocol are coded in a similar way in ProVerif. We therefore omit their ProVerif versions.
ProVerif can establish the security property claimed above, using the technique described in [16] . The proof is fully automatic. For a large class of protocols in which messages are tagged, ProVerif is guaranteed to terminate [20] ; our example does not quite fit in this class (in particular, because of the use of inequality tests), but ProVerif does terminate nonetheless. ProVerif can similarly establish security properties of many more complex protocols.
Computational Soundness
While formal analysis of protocols has traditionally provided only formal results, like those stated in Section 3, the exact status of those results can be unclear. Do they entail any actual guarantees, or is formal analysis valuable only as a means of identifying assumptions, explaining protocols, and sometimes finding mistakes?
One approach to addressing such questions is to try to map the formal results to a more concrete model via a general theorem. Such a theorem should enable us to leverage high-level notations, proof techniques, and proof tools for obtaining guarantees for large families of protocols. In this section we discuss this approach and how it applies to the WMF protocol.
In the more concrete model, cryptographic operations work on bitstrings, not expressions, and are subject to standard complexity-theoretic assumptions. Names are interpreted as bitstrings-more precisely, ensembles of probability distributions on bitstrings, parameterized by a security parameter η. This interpretation is extended to a mapping from symbolic expressions to bitstrings. The adversary may perform any computation on bitstrings, and not only the basic expected cryptographic operations; the adversary is however constrained to run in (probabilistic) polynomial time with respect to η.
Computational-soundness theorems translate symbolic guarantees to computational guarantees. In particular, a recent computational-soundness theorem [26] , on which we rely, roughly says that the symbolic equivalence of two processes implies their computational indistinguishability. In other words, the distinguishing capabilities of a computational attacker are not stronger than the distinguishing capabilities of the symbolic attacker, whose range of operations is much more limited. Of course, these theorems also indicate assumptions, in particular hypotheses on cryptographic operations. Unexpected but necessary hypotheses sometimes surface when one proves soundness theorems.
Assumptions. Specifically, the theorem of [26] requires some assumptions on the encryption scheme:
-IND-CPA security (the standard semantic guarantee for secrecy [31] , also called "type-3 security" [7] ), and -INT-CTXT security (an authentication guarantee [11] ).
It also requires that:
-the attacker can create a key only using the key-generation algorithm; -there are no encryption cycles: there is an ordering < on private keys such that, if k < k , then k may appear in the plaintext of a ciphertext encrypted under k , but not the converse; -finally, it is possible to compute a symbolic representation of any bitstring-this is a "parsing assumption".
The assumptions are far from trivial: IND-CPA is standard, but INT-CTXT is strong, and the inability to create keys without following the key-generation algorithms is quite unusual. These three properties are however necessary for the soundness theorem: if one of these three hypotheses fails, we can find protocols that appear secure symbolically but that are not secure computationally, under some encryption schemes. In fact, under some encryption schemes that do not satisfy INT-CTXT, there are computational attacks on the WMF protocol in particular.
Encryption cycles have attracted a great deal of attention in recent years, in part because of computational-soundness theorems, but they are of independent interest. Their exact status remains a well-known open question.
The parsing assumption is probably not necessary, but eases the proofs.
Application to WMF. Since P (m) ∼ P (m ) has been proved using ProVerif, we should get some computational indistinguishability guarantee, thanks to the theorem of [26] discussed above. That theorem pertains to a symbolic equivalence relation ∼ s that distinguishes slightly more processes than ∼ and ProVerif. For instance, ∼ s distinguishes two symbolic messages whose computational interpretations have distinct lengths, while ∼ may not. This discrepancy illustrates that further work is needed for establishing a perfect match between models. Moreover, the soundness theorems remain hard to establish and they do not yet cover all useful cryptographic primitives, nor all sensible styles for writing protocol code.
The discrepancy might be resolved by refining ∼ by introducing functions that, given a ciphertext, reveal the length, structure, or other properties of the underlying plaintext. Such functions could also be incorporated in ProVerif analyses.
For our specific example, more simply, we may require that encryption conceal the length of payloads, and we can weaken ∼ s accordingly. This approach is acceptable for the WMF protocol since its messages can be assumed to have a constant length. In this case, ∼ and ∼ s coincide, so the ProVerif verification actually establishes P (m) ∼ s P (m ). Moreover, we have proved manually the absence of encryption cycles so, for implementations that satisfy the other assumptions of the computationalsoundness theorem, we obtain the desired computational indistinguishability guarantee.
The WMF Protocol in CryptoVerif
In this section, we study the WMF protocol using CryptoVerif. In contrast to the approach of Section 4, CryptoVerif works directly in the computational model, and provides proofs by sequences of games, like those constructed manually by cryptographers. In these proofs, one starts from an initial game that represents the protocol under study. This game is then transformed either by relying on security assumptions on cryptographic primitives or by syntactic transformations. These transformations are such that the difference of probability of success of an attack in consecutive games is negligible. The final game is such that the desired security property is obvious from the form of the game. One can then conclude that the security property also holds in the initial game.
The WMF Protocol in CryptoVerif. In order to automate this technique, the games are formalized in a process calculus, as we illustrate on the WMF protocol. Throughout this section, we refer to a and b as honest principals, and we focus on them in writing code. The adversary can play the role of dishonest principals.
The following process P A models the role of A:
host, xB : host); if xA = a ∨ xA = b then let KAs = (if xA = a then Kas else Kbs) in new rKab : keyseed ; let Kab : key = kgen(rKab) in new r : seed ; c 3 xA, encrypt(concat(c0, xB , Kab), KAs, r )
The process P A starts with a replication bounded by N , which is assumed to be polynomial in the security parameter: at most N copies of A can be run. Two host names are then received on channel c 2 : xA is the name of the host playing the role of A, xB is the name of its interlocutor; xA is required to equal a or b. Then KAs is defined as the key of xA. The protocol proper starts at this point: P A chooses a fresh key Kab to be shared between xA and xB by generating a random seed rKab (new rKab : keyseed ) and applying the key-generation algorithm kgen. Next, P A forms the first message, and sends it on channel c 3 . The function concat builds the plaintext to be encrypted by concatenating its arguments (a tag, a host name, and a key). After the output on c 3 , control returns to the adversary.
Variables are typed. These types simply represent sets of bitstrings, and have no security meaning. They are still necessary in the computational model, in particular when generating random numbers: the random numbers can be drawn from various sets (keys, random seeds, nonces, . . . ).
The messages are each sent or received on a distinct channel c j . Furthermore, the replication ! N implicitly defines an index i ∈ [1, N ], and the channel names c j are in fact abbreviations for c j [i], so that a distinct channel is used in each copy of the process. Thus, the adversary knows exactly to which process it is talking. Using distinct channel names and replication indices replaces the process identifiers (pid ) of the model of Section 3.
The following process P B represents the role of B:
Similarly to P A , the process P B is replicated, and expects as first message its own identity xB ; xB is required to equal a or b and KBs is its key. Then a message (normally from the server) is received on channel c 10 , and P B decrypts this message. The decryption can succeed or fail. When it succeeds, it returns a normal bitstring; when it fails, it returns ⊥. The function injbot is the natural injection from bitstrings to bitstrings union ⊥, so that when injbot(y) = decrypt(x , KBs), the decryption succeeded and its value is y. Next, when the interlocutor xA of xB is honest, the process P B encrypts the payload mpayload under the shared key kab and sends the ciphertext on channel c 11 .
(The function pad is only a type conversion function, which converts payloads to plaintexts; it leaves the bitstrings unchanged.)
The process P K is a key-registration process:
All variables defined under replications in CryptoVerif are implicitly arrays indexed by the replication index. So, here, P K stands for:
In order to register a key k 1 for host h 1 , the adversary sends a pair (h 1 , k 1 ) on channel c 12 [i] for some i. The host name h 1 is stored in h[i] while the key k 1 is stored in Khs[i], except when h 1 is a or b; in this case, the key Kas or Kbs respectively is stored instead, so that the only keys that can be registered for a and b are Kas and Kbs respectively. In order to retrieve the key for host h , one can then look for an index u such that h[u ] = h ; the key for h is Khs [u ] . This is done by the construct find u ≤ N 2 suchthat defined(
The role of the server is specified by the process P S :
The first message of the protocol is received on channel c 6 . The variable KAs is set to the key of xA. Then the server decrypts the message with KAs, sets KBs to the key of xB , and finally outputs the second message of the protocol on channel c 7 .
The following process P receives two payloads m0 and m1 , chooses a bit switch, and sets the payload mpayload to be encrypted by P B to either m0 or m1 depending on the value of switch. (We will show that the adversary cannot distinguish switch from a fresh random bit, so it cannot distinguish whether the encrypted payload is m0 or m1 .) Next, P generates the keys Kas and Kbs for a and b respectively, using the key-generation algorithm kgen; then it launches processes for the various roles of the protocol and for key registration:
new switch : bool ; let mpayload : payload = test(switch, m0 , m1 ) in new rKas : keyseed ; let Kas : key = kgen(rKas) in new rKbs : keyseed ; let Kbs : key = kgen(rKbs) in c 14 ;
Here test is defined by test(true, m0 , m1 ) = m0 and test(false, m0 , m1 ) = m1 .
Assumptions. In addition to these processes, the CryptoVerif model also specifies several hypotheses:
-The encryption scheme is IND-CPA and INT-CTXT.
-The function concat returns bitstrings of constant length. Moreover, concat is injective, and it is possible to compute x, y, z from concat(x, y, z) in polynomial time. -All payloads have the same length.
We do not assume that the attacker can create a key only using the key-generation algorithm. This contrasts with the assumptions of Section 4, which apply to a large class of protocols, including protocols for which there would be computational attacks without this assumption. Neither do we assume the absence of encryption cycles; however, the success of the game transformation sequence shows that there is a key hierarchy. Finally, we do not have any parsing assumption.
Analysis. With the model presented above, CryptoVerif is not able to complete the proof of the desired properties. Manual inspection of the games computed by CryptoVerif shows that, in P A , it fails to distinguish automatically the cases in which the key Kab is generated for an honest interlocutor a or b from the cases in which it is generated for a dishonest interlocutor. The code can easily be modified to make this distinction from the start, simply by adding the test "if xB = b ∨ xB = a then" just before the generation of rKab and duplicating the rest of the process P A . With this modification, the proof of secrecy of switch succeeds automatically. That is, the adversary cannot distinguish switch from a fresh random bit, so it cannot tell whether the encrypted payload is m0 or m1 .
Additionally, CryptoVerif can also show secrecy properties of the key exchanged between A and B, after removal of the payload message. (We do not present the corresponding process for brevity.) More precisely, CryptoVerif shows that the keys Kab chosen by P A when xA and xB are honest principals are secret, that is, indistinguishable from fresh independent random keys. However, CryptoVerif cannot show the secrecy of the keys kab received by P B when xA and xB are honest principals. This failure is not due to a limitation of CryptoVerif, but to an attack: by replaying messages in the protocol, the adversary can force several sessions of B to use the same key kab. Hence, those keys kab may not be independent. CryptoVerif still establishes what we call "onesession secrecy", that is, that each key kab (for xA and xB honest) is indistinguishable from a fresh random key.
The Sequence of Games (Summary).
In order to establish the secrecy of switch, CryptoVerif successively reduces the original game to simpler games, using the security assumptions. In a first step, it performs syntactic transformations to make explicit all usages of the key Kbs and to replace it with its value kgen(rKbs). The obtained game is then transformed using the INT-CTXT assumption: CryptoVerif replaces every decryption of a message M under Kbs with a look-up that searches for M among all ciphertexts built by encryption under Kbs. If the ciphertext M is found, the look-up returns the corresponding plaintext; otherwise, decryption fails and the look-up returns ⊥. If the attacker wins the game before this transformation, then either it wins the new game or, at some point, it has been able to forge an encryption under Kbs. In the latter case, it would break INT-CTXT. Then, CryptoVerif replaces any plaintext M that is encrypted under Kbs with Z(M ), a bitstring of the same length as M but consisting only of zeroes. This time, if the attacker wins the game before this transformation, then either it wins the new game or it wins an IND-CPA game.
CryptoVerif performs similar transformations for the key Kas. At this stage, the key Kab no longer occurs as a plaintext. CryptoVerif now applies the same transformations as above, for this key, and finally replaces all payloads mpayload encrypted under Kab with the same plaintext Z(mpayload ). The final game is trivial: it cannot be won by an attacker.
Conclusion
Model refinements such as those that we discuss in this paper, while numerous and varied, should not be fundamentally surprising. After all, reasoning about software and hardware correctness often employs similar refinements. Furthermore, in any area, models and the corresponding proofs may be incomplete and inaccurate. Security, however, is different in at least one important respect: an adversary may be doing its best to undermine the validity of the models. This specificity increases the importance of understanding refinements, and the interest of the corresponding theory. Within this domain, we believe that the transition from symbolic to computational models is particularly worthwhile. It can serve for strengthening the foundations of formal analysis, for enabling proofs, and also for indicating implicit hypotheses and subtle flaws.
It remains open to debate whether computational results should be obtained directly, with a tool such as CryptoVerif, or indirectly from symbolic proofs via soundness theorems. Soundness theorems often require more hypotheses: there are situations in which a computational proof can be obtained using CryptoVerif, while the hypotheses of soundness theorems are not met. However, when the hypotheses are satisfied, a symbolic proof suffices, and is generally easier to obtain, often automatically.
At present, both avenues still present challenges. ProVerif, CryptoVerif, and the soundness theorems all still have important limitations. These imply, for instance, that one should be careful in writing protocol specifications-not all equivalent formulations are equally easy to handle. Despite these limitations, as this paper illustrates, the progress to date is substantial.
